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Since its development 20 years ago, the
serial reaction time task (SRTT) has gone
from being a tool used by psychologists
(Nissen and Bullemer, 1987) to one that,
in the last few years, has been embraced by
a wider community (Fig. 1). Embedded
within this task is a sequence, a connected
series of events, that engages processes
supporting the temporal organization of
behavior, the formation of high-order as-
sociations, and the prediction of future
events (Keele et al., 2004; Chafee and
Ashe, 2007). Thus, this task has been used
to explore the processes underlying a
broad range of behaviors, including the
cognitive and biological principles of
learning and memory. Despite this suc-
cess, it remains a task that is frequently
misunderstood. Questions surround how
task performance should be measured,
whether it is appropriate to conceptualize
the SRTT as an implicit learning task,
whether it is a motor task, and whether it
is dependent on the integrity of themedial
temporal lobe (MTL). Here we briefly de-
scribe the SRTT and discuss these ques-
tions. An appreciation of these questions
will aid the design and interpretation of
future neuroscientific experiments.
The serial reaction time task
In this task, a visual cue can appear at any
one of four positions arranged horizon-
tally on a computer screen. Each screen
position, designated 1–4, corresponds to
a button on a response pad. When a cue
appears, at the start of each trial, a partic-
ipant selects the appropriate response
button, which ends the trial (Fig. 1). The
duration of each trial, defined by the par-
ticipant’s response time, is the primary
task measure. At the end of each trial,
there is a short fixed delay, often between
200 and 500ms, before another cue is pre-
sented. The visual cues play out a repeat-
ing sequence of positions (for example,
2-3-1-4-3-2-4-1-3-4-2-1). These sequen-
tial trials are then followed by random tri-
als in which the visual cue no longer plays
out a repeating pattern of positions. Thus,
the SRTT is an apparently straightforward
four-choice reaction time task containing
a repeating sequence that participants
come to predict, and so learn. However,
there are a number of misunderstandings
and open questions that continue to sur-
round this seductively simple task. Here
we briefly touch on some of these issues.
Measuring skill learning
In the SRTT, a simple measure of skill
may be to measure the gradual reduc-
tion in response time that takes place
across the sequential trials (Fig. 1). This
provides a measure of participants’
growing expertise in performing not
only the sequence but also in learning
the visuomotor association, or map-
ping, between the position of the visual
cue and the required response. This lat-
ter component should not be underesti-
mated: when a visuomotor association
is learned in isolation, as participants
perform random trials, there can be
substantial reductions in response time
(Fig. 1). Thus, a change in sequential
response time, although simple, sup-
plies a general measure of participants’
competence at performing the SRTT. A
more specific measure of skill learning
can be obtained by contrasting the se-
quential response times against those
response times for the random trials.
Not only does this analysis provide a
specific measure of skill, it also mini-
mizes the possible contaminating influ-
ences of factors such as fatigue and mo-
tivation. There is also a subtle but
nonetheless important advantage of us-
ing the difference between sequential
and random response times over using
sequential response times alone. When
the sequence is unexpectedly removed
and replaced with random trials, the
participant initially continues to inap-
propriately play out the sequence. This
mistake inflates the random response
times, increasing the difference between
the sequential and random response
times. This implies that the difference
measure of skill is not only specific but is
also highly sensitive to participants’ ex-
pectation that the visual cues will play
out a sequence of positions. Thus, the
difference between sequential and ran-
dom response times provides a specific
and sensitive measure of skill acquisi-
tion in the SRTT.
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Implicit learning
Skill learning, and particularly that ac-
quired with the SRTT, is often portrayed
as an example of implicit learning. Al-
though an individual can be unaware of
learning (implicit learning), it is also pos-
sible for an individual to be aware of
learning a new skill (explicit learning). A
challenging problem has been to define
when individuals have become aware of
learning. One of the strengths of the SRTT
is that there are many distinct and com-
plementary techniques available for mea-
suring awareness. For example, implicit
learning can be defined behaviorally as re-
calling only a few items of the sequence
during a free recall test or having a poor
recognition for segments of the sequence
during a recognition test (Curran, 1997;
Willingham and Goedert-Eschmann,
1999). Alternatively, others have sought
to define implicit learning neuropsycho-
logically as the skill that can be acquired
by amnesiacs who can neither recall nor
recognize any aspect of the learned se-
quence (Reber and Squire, 1994). These
measures assume that awareness and de-
clarative knowledge for the sequence, al-
though distinct, are developing in parallel.
Thus, tests of declarative knowledge are
viewed as tests of awareness. Such an as-
sumptionmay be justified. However, oth-
ers have suggested that all tests of implicit
learning are flawed because they lack the
necessary sensitivity or specificity to de-
tect awareness (Hannula et al., 2005). This
perspective, however, assumes that there
is a single moment at which an individual
is transformed from being unaware to be-
ing aware of learning and that this mo-
ment can be measured, whereas aware-
ness may be a continuum. Thus, any
attempt to define a particular moment of
awareness could be arbitrary. Innovative
techniques may address this problem by
allowing the continuumof an individual’s
awareness to be mapped out (Persaud et
al., 2007). Unfortunately, as yet, there is
no consensus about how to measure an
individual’s awareness for learning in this
task. Nonetheless, some component of
learning is likely achieved implicitly, and
there is an array of complementary tech-
niques that can provide insight into indi-
viduals’ awareness for learning.
An elegant technique that overcomes
many of the problems associated with
measuring awareness is to directlymanip-
ulate individuals’ awareness for the se-
quence. This can be achieved by instruct-
ing individuals that a particular color of
visual stimuli is associated with a se-
quence, while participants remain un-
aware that another color of visual stimuli
is also playing out a sequence (Willing-
ham et al., 2002; Robertson et al., 2004).
Thus an individual is aware of learning
one sequence but unaware of learning the
other sequence. By contrasting between
these conditions of explicit and implicit
sequence learning, it is possible to gain in-
sight into the effects of awareness on brain
activation and behavior. Thus, without
supplying a definitive solution to the chal-
lenging problem of measuring awareness,
it is possible to gain insight into the cog-
nitive and biological features of
awareness.
Motor learning
Although the SRTT is often viewed as a
motor learning task, it is not clear that
learning is taking place solely within the
motor domain. The serial regularity could
be learned as a sequence of motor re-
sponses with participants learning the
correct sequence of response buttons. Al-
ternatively, the serial regularity could be
learned perceptually as a sequence of vi-
sual cue positions: participants would
learn to predict the position of each visual
cue and so would respond quickly to the
appearance of the visual cue. Recent work
has shown that sequence learning can be
supported by purely perceptual learning;
however, this occurs when the SRTT has
been modified to remove the motor se-
quence (Dennis et al., 2006).With nomo-
tor sequence, individuals are forced to use
the only regularity available, present
within the perceptual domain, and so
learn the sequence perceptually. In con-
trast, when both a perceptual and amotor
Figure 1. A, Using the SRTT has become increasingly popular: as many studies using the SRTT have taken place in the last 5
years as were conducted in the preceding 15 years. B, A schematic of the SRTT: a visual cue appears, a participant responds by
selecting the appropriate response button, the visual cue disappears, ending the trial, and after a fixed delay, another visual cue
appearsmarking thebeginningof a new trial. Theposition of the visual cue can either play out a repeating sequence or be random.
C, Response time data from a single participant, showing a steady decrease over the initial random and sequential trials until the
reintroduction of the random trials, when there is a dramatic increase in response time. The magnitude of this increase is often
used as a measure of sequence learning in the SRTT (Willingham et al., 1989). D, The MTL is activated during SRTT sequence
learning, and a circuit that includes the MTL makes a critical contribution to this learning (Curran, 1997; Schendan et al., 2003).
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sequence are available, learning is no
longer purely perceptual (Willingham,
1999). Thus, the SRTT is not simply amo-
tor learning task; it can have both motor
and perceptual learning components.
Recognizing that perceptual learning is a
component of the SRTT is important. It
provides an explanation for the shift in
brain areas supporting SRTT perfor-
mance when the perceptual properties of
the SRTT are altered (Robertson et al.,
2001).
When performing the SRTT, individu-
als acquire skill at producing a sequence,
plus they can also acquire an ability to de-
claratively describe the sequence. Having
performed the SRTT, an individual might
be able to verbally describe some or all of
the sequence contained within the task.
This combination of skill plus declarative
knowledge for that skill is present within
many everyday behaviors. For example,
we can skillfully produce a sequence of
finger movements to tap out a phone
number, plus we are also able to tell others
the number to call. Thus the SRTT is not
exclusively a motor learning task; it in-
cludes an important declarative compo-
nent, demonstrated by our ability to ver-
bally describe some or all of the sequence
within the SRTT. Recognizing that declar-
ative learning is also a component of the
SRTT provides an explanation for how
learning aword list can influence task per-
formance: word-list learning disrupts the
declarative component and so allows the
off-line enhancement of the procedural
component of the SRTT (Brown andRob-
ertson, 2007).
Themedial temporal lobe and the SRTT
Typically, motor skill learning is sup-
ported by a circuit that includes motor
cortical areas and subcortical areas such as
the striatum and the cerebellum. A similar
pattern of areas are engaged during learn-
ing in the SRTT (Keele et al., 2004). The
prefrontal cortex, striatum, and cerebel-
lum all make critical contributions to
SRTT performance improvements
(Pascual-Leone et al., 1993; Robertson et
al., 2001; Torriero et al., 2004). Insight
into the nature of these contributions is
possible through subtle but simple
changes to the configuration of the SRTT.
This hasmade it possible to tease apart the
neural circuits responsible for supporting
learning within different coordinate
frames or to examine the influence of
awareness on the engagement of brain ar-
eas (Willingham et al., 2002; Cohen et al.,
2005). Thus, the SRTT can act as a bridge
between brain and behavior, providing
insights into the computational contribu-
tion that brain areas make to sequence
learning. A poignant example of this ca-
pacity is provided by the differential en-
gagement of the MTL during SRTT per-
formance. TheMTL is engaged andmakes
a critical contribution to the acquisition of
high- but not low-order sequences even
when participants are not declaratively
learning any of the sequence (Curran,
1997; Schendan et al., 2003). Predicting
the next event (i.e., n) within a high-order
sequence requires knowledge of the two
immediately preceding events [i.e., (n 
2) plus (n 1)], whereas predicting low-
order sequences only requires knowledge
of the preceding event [i.e., (n 1)]. The
MTL is engaged to support learning when
there is a greater temporal component to
the SRTT. Similarly, the MTL does not
make a critical contribution to classical
conditioning until this simple form of
motor learning is modified to include a
temporal component, as occurs in trace
conditioning (Solomon et al., 1986).
Thus, engagement of the MTL is related
not to the type of behavior being sup-
ported (e.g., declarative vs procedural),
but instead to the computational require-
ments of that task. This principle may be
applicable to the engagement of other
brain areas.
Conclusion
The SRTT is a seductively simple task, ap-
pearing to be just a four-choice reaction
time task that provides a convenient mea-
sure of implicit motor skill learning. Here
we have described several of the miscon-
ceptions that surround this task to reveal a
powerfully sophisticated task that can
provide insights into a wider and richer
array of human behaviors than its popular
classification would imply. Appreciating
the subtle complexity of this task will pro-
vide an aid to the design and interpreta-
tion of experiments.
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